There would be several advantages for the Government of India by adhering to the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). For instance, adhering would ease
international pressures spearheaded by the United States, Great Britain, and
France. As India is just starting to become a nuclear power of its own, the
already nuclear “powers that be” want to use India as an example to the rest
of the world. As more countries become nuclear, they should sign the CTBT and
follow the footsteps of the rest of the world powers. Another advantage of
adhering to the CTBT is that Pakistan will also sign if India signs. (N.B. with
the stipulation that the US ratifies the treaty) If Pakistan adheres; it will be
easier for the Indian government to use information obtained by national means
of verification “in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles
of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of
States.” (CTBT Article IV #5) This means that India will be able to see how
much Pakistan is adhering to the stipulations of CTBT. There are however,
several disadvantages of adhering to the CTBT. For instance, if India does not
adhere, the government keeps on testing; Pakistan would match test for test.
Both countries have been at odds with each other for a while. When India tested
a nuclear explosion, Pakistan answered immediately with a test of their own. If
India does not adhere they would be put in a costly and possibly deadly arms
race with the Pakistani government. Defense spending would increase drastically
on both sides. The Pakistani economy is not as strong as the Indian, which means
that Pakistan will be the first to declare bankruptcy. A failed economy with an
internal government in turmoil could heighten the chance of a Taleban-like group
to seize power in Pakistan. If a radical group with a hatred of the Indian
government were to take power, an all-out war would be imminent, possibly
nuclear. The CTBT also focuses too much on the big nuclear powers of the world.
Countries such as the United States, Russia, and China are the real winners in
this deal. Smaller countries such as India have to worry about threats, as the
‘big ones’ do not. For example, India is in constant turmoil with Pakistan,
and both are have nuclear capabilities. If India does not adhere to the CTBT,
neither will Pakistan. If this were to be so, India would have to stockpile
enough nuclear arms to stay on top of Pakistan. This is relevant to the US-USSR
model of deterrence. The United States wanted to have a large number of nuclear
weapons to be able to back up their threat of nuclear attacks on Russian soil.
If the USSR were to launch, the United States wanted to have a second strike
capability which would cripple the Russian homeland, hence to deter the Russians
from making a preemptive strike. India also wants to deter Pakistan from
launching if neither adheres to the CTBT. India wants to continue as a nuclear
power to try and deter the Pakistani government from launching into Indian
Territory. 2. If the United States were to build their Anti Ballistic Missile
system (ABM) in North America, it would be a clear violation of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed in 1972, thus forcing the U.S withdrawal
from the treaty. The U.S. government point of view has been that the new ABM
system will be focused on shooting down limited attacks from “rogue” nuclear
states, considered to be North Korea, Iran, and possibly Iraq. This possible ABM
system has Russia in an uproar. There are definite fears throughout the Russian
government if the U.S. builds this ABM system. For instance, with this new ABM
system, the United States would have a distinct advantage in the nuclear arms
division. The U.S. could possibly have a distinct first strike capability, which
would be remarkably efficient. This is a valid fear among Russian officials. The
U.S. could hypothetically launch first against the Russians. Russia would then
launch in retaliation to the attack. With the new ABM system set up, the United
States could (hypothetically) shoot down a good number of the incoming ICBMs,
absorb a diminished attack, then launch again with another arsenal of nuclear
missiles. The United States takes a few hits in one attack whereas Russia takes
the full brunt of two attacks. This hypothetical attack is not considered valid
among U.S. officials. They claim that the ABM system will only be a defense
against a limited attack, which means defense against less than a handful of
ICBMs from the “rogue” states. It is not meant as a defense against an
attack against a whole arsenal of Russian missiles. The United States says that
Russia should share some responsibility for recognizing that rapid technological
change and new political realities are required changes in the ABM Treaty. With
this in mind, the United States has offered to help build an ABM system in the
Siberian territory of Russia in exchange for support or even modification of the
treaty. The Russian government quickly shot this down, as they could not compete
technically or monetarily with the United States. This ‘safeguard’ of both
countries having an ABM system is sufficient from a U.S.-USSR nuclear deterrent
perspective. The Cold War between the United States and Russia lasted nearly 60
years without a nuclear shot fired. This was largely because both countries were
fairly balanced in the nuclear department. The arms race forced stockpiling of
nuclear missiles on both sides of the Pacific. There has always been a delicate
balance of power between the two States. Both Russia and the United States have
the biggest nuclear arsenal around the world, and both had sufficient
second-strike capabilities. Either side was afraid to launch because they knew
the other side could easily respond. The United States wants to keep this
delicate balance. They want to help Russia build its own ABM system to compete
with the U.S. system. If the United States is the only one with the ABM system,
the balance is thrown, but if both sides are protected the balance is restored.